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Treating Crazy People Less Specially
STEPHEN

I.

J.

MORSE*

t

INTRODUCTION

Mental health laws treat mentally disordered people differently
from other adults in virtually every area of civil and criminal law . 1
Some mental health laws provide a benefit the crazy person desires.
Examples are the disordered person's opportunity to defeat a criminal prosecution by claiming legal insanity or to avoid a contract
by claiming incompetence to contract. Other mental health laws,
such as provisions for involuntary commitment and treatment, operate contrary to the crazy person's desires. In all cases, however,
special legal treatment results from the assumption that crazy persons are not responsible for their behavior, an assumption buttressed
by the mistaken and usually unanalyzed notion that mental disorder
per se deprives people of responsibility.
The best recent example of the adoption of this incorrect assumption, "the common wisdom," is the United States Supreme
Court's decision in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 2
which held that mental retardation is not a quasi-suspect classification. The Court rejected the argument that, under the Equal Protection Clause, laws that distinguish the retarded as a class should
be subjected to particularly careful examination to determine if they
substantially further an important governmental purpose. Although
the case dealt specifically with retarded people, the majority recognized that its reasoning also applied to the mentally ill, and thus

• Orrin B. Evans Professor of Law, Psychiatry and the Behavioral Sciences, USC Law Center.
This article was fir st presented as the Edward G. Donley Memorial Lecture at the West Virginia
University College of Law, March , 1987. In revised form, it will appear in the author' s forthcoming
book, The Jurisprudence of Craziness (Oxford University Press). I want to thank Heidi M. Hurd for
editorial assistance and Brad Kuenning for research assistance.
t Copyright 1987 by S. J. Morse .
I. See S. BRAKEL, J. PARRY & B. WIENER, THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW (3d ed.
1985).
2. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S . 432 (1985).
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the decision makes it eas1er fo r legislatures to distinguish the mentally disordered.
To support its holding ,
people have ' 'reduced ability
ryday world. " 3 Do wn playing
tipathy towards the retarded
Court also concluded that:

the Court determined that retarded
to cope with and function in the evethe history of discrimination and anand their political powerlessness, the

[S]ingling out the retarded for special treatment reflects the rea l and undeniable
differences between the retar ded and others. That a civilized and decent society
expects and approves such legi slat ion indicates that governm ental consideration
of those differences in the vast majority of situations is not only legitimate but
. . . des ira ble."

Although the Court recognized that retarded people differ substantially in their ability to cope and that the disabilities of some are
not immediately evident , it refused to apply heightened scrutiny to
laws that distinguish the retarded as a class. 5
In sum, the law's present view is that great deference must be
granted to legislative decisions to treat retarded and mentally disordered people specially because the retarded and the mentally disordered as entire classes are specially unable to cope with the demands
of the world. Thus all mental health laws deprive allegedly crazy
persons of the usual, dignity-conferring presumptions of responsibility and competence.
I suggest, however, that fewer crazy persons are nonresponsible
and incompetent than is commonly supposed. The behavior of some
crazy people surely satisfies the correct general criteria of nonresponsibility-irrationality and compulsion. 6 Nevertheless, the common wisdom is too sweeping; laypersons and mental health

3. Id. at 422.
4. ld. at 444.
5. For a sensitive reading of Cleburne that distinguishes three approaches to treating classes
of "different" people-"the 'abnormal persons' approach," the "rights analysis approach," and the
"social relations approach" -see Minow, Wh en Difference Has Its Hom e: Group Homes for the
Mentally Retarded, Equal Protection and Legal Treatment of Difference, 22 HARV . C.R.-C.L. L.
REv. Ill (1987).
6. Morse, Psychology, Determinism, and Legal Responsibility, in THE LAw AS A BEHAVIORAL
I NSTRUMENT: NEBRASKA SYMPOSIUM ON MOTIVATION 35, 59-7 1 (G. Melton ed . 1986).
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professionals alike tend consistently to underestimate the capabilities
of crazy people. Thus, even when the legal system tightens mental
health law criteria and procedures, as it did for involuntary commitment in the 1970s, the law continues to ensnare large numbers
of crazy people because decisionmakers guided by the "common
wisdom" fail in practice to apply strictly the laws on the books.
Even reformed laws sweep far too broadly because crazy people are
far more responsible than is usually assumed. Finally, singling out
crazy people for special legal treatment is often not the optimal
means to achieve the social purposes that the behavioral components
of mental health laws are meant to achieve.

II.

POLITICAL AND MORAL ASSUMPTIONS

The scope of mental health laws differs at various times; sometimes the law seems willing to treat many people specially and at
other times the law treats few specially. Policy shifts can result from
changes in political or social preferences, from changes in conclusions about the capabilities of crazy people, or, more probably, from
some combination of both. But differing conclusions about the capabilities of crazy people do not logically entail political and legal
changes. For example, assume that behavioral scientists were able
rigorously to confirm that crazy people are substantially less able
to behave rationally than we currently suppose. Assume further that
the mentally disordered as a class were considered legally responsible
in general prior to the new scientific findings. If the standards for
legal responsibility did not shift, we might conclude that laws treating the disordered as less responsible were now justified. But if society simultaneously decided on moral and political grounds to lower
the threshold for legal responsibility, the mentally disordered as a
class might still be capable of meeting the general standards, and
special laws would not be justified. Thus, the political and legal
consequences that follow from an accurate view of the capabilities
of crazy people depend on one's political and moral preferences.
Before assessing the capabilities of crazy people, it is therefore
necessary to make explicit the moral and political preferences that
inform my legal recommendations. I will not offer any foundational
justification for these preferences because I do not believe such foun-

I
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dations can be provided. 7 What I hope to offer instead is an internally coherent account that entails a strong preference for negative
liberty and autonomy, 8 for respecting persons' stated, present preferences, for erring on the side of leaving persons alone to do as
they wish, and for treating all persons alike and as responsible and
competent citizens as often as possible .9 I wish to examine the implications of applying these views to mentally disordered people.
Now let me be more specific about the preference for liberty.
First, a preference for liberty entails the adoption of a non-ideal,
"desire" theory of the good life that assumes that persons are the
best judges of what is good for them and that there is no ''true''
good independent of a person's tastes, preferences, values and desires. 10 Pluralist liberal societies are based on such assumptions. Rationality or some minimalist conception of primary goods may
constrain this view-some desires or preferences may be so outlandish, for example, that we are unwilling to credit the person as
a rational being-but a non-ideal theory of the good life will emphasize a subjective view of the good and thus will insist on caution
before we may claim that what a person prefers is not good for
him. Unwanted personal or state intervention into another's life requires stronger justification according to a non-ideal theory than
according to an ideal theory that defines the good independently of
preferences as virtue, excellence, or achievement. The non-ideal view
would presume strongly, but not conclusively, that the mentally disordered and the mentally normal alike know what is best for them.
Second, a preference for liberty entails the adoption of the related assumption that a person's true preferences or desires are those

7. See generally D. HERZOG, WITHOUT FOUNDATIONS: JUSTIFICATION IN POLITICAl. THEORY (1985).
8. My usage of negative liberty follows that most famously associated with Isaiah Berlin in
his seminal essay, I. BERLIN, Two Concepts of Liberty, in FouR EssAYS ON LIBERTY xxxvii, 118 (1969).
9 . My preferences most closely approximate what Martha Minow identifies as the "rights
analysis approach." Minow, supra note 5, at 122-27, 153-57. Unlike Professor Minow, however, I
do not believe that the rights analysis approach is inconsistent with a contextualist approach to knowledge or with the many benefits that might flow from the social relations approach. !d. at 184-86.
For example, a redefinition of the significance of human traits to enhance relationships between people
is consistent with a rights analysis approach. See infra text accompanying note 44.
10. On the distinction between "ideal" and "desire" theories of the good, see , e.g. , Brock,
Paternalism and Promoting the Good, in PATERNALISM 237, 250-54 (R. Sartorius ed. 1983) .
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he or she claims, even if those preferences seem imprudent, harmful,
or immoral. This subjective assumption strongly presumes that the
person knows best what his or her preferences are. Conversely, this
assumption rejects idealized, exalted metaphysical notions of a person 's will, which hold that the person's " real" desires, despite his
or her claims to the contrary, are those a hypothetical, ideally ration al person might choose. 11 It also rejects claims that a person's
real preferences are unconscious, psychodynamic wishes the person
may be unable to acknowledge. 12
Rejecting "ideal" or unconscious preferences as real preferences
does not mean that a person's behavior is not sometimes foolish
and is not on some occasions caused by unconscious psychological
determinants. It does mean, however, that a person's stated preferences are his or her preferences, whether or not they seem "fully"
rational and without regard to how they are caused. To assume
otherwise is to deprive a person of integrity and autonomy. The
subjective assumption that a person best understands his or her own
preferences demands that great caution be exercised before permitting external observers to impose unwanted paternalistic impositions
on the ground that the observer knows the person's "real" preferences better and is thus doing what the person "really" wants.
Third, a preference for liberty entails, either on consequential
or nonconsequential grounds, the assumption that the deprivation
of negative liberty is generally harmful. Whether treated as a deontological trump or as a thumb · on the consequential scale, liberty
is entitled to great and perhaps decisive weight. Liberty is so important that decisionmakers should be cautious either about depriving a person of the trump because he or she is nonresponsible
or about overweighing other factors in a consequential balance.
Fourth, a preference for liberty entails the assumption that responsibility and competence should be treated as threshold rather

11. On hypothetical rationality, see J . FEINBERG, 3 HARM TO SELF: THE MoRAL LIMITS OF THE
184-86 (1986); J. KLEINIG , PATER NALISM 63-67 (1984).
12. See Morse , Failed Explanations and Criminal Responsibility: Experts and the Unconscious,
68 VA . L. REV. 971, 991-1039 (1982).
CRIMI NAL LAW
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than relativistic concepts 13 and that the law should set the threshold
quite low. If we think of responsibility and competence as distributed
along a continuum, then in a sense everyone is less responsible or
competent than people who are more so. Thus, in the abstract, the
law could allocate liberty benefits proportionately to one's degree
of responsibility and competence; more responsible and competent
people would have more legal autonomy and liberty and vice versa
along the continuum. This is the relativist concept. The alternative,
threshold concept treats responsibility and competence as bright lines.
Once a person exceeds the threshold, he or she is considered fully
responsible or competent, and those on the other side of the threshold are treated as nonresponsible or incompetent.
The threshold concept, with the threshold set quite low, is preferable because it grants more autonomy and liberty to more people
more of the time, thus treating more people as full persons worthy
of dignity and respect. Although our society should not have unrealistic expectations and standards for our most mentally disabled
citizens, most people should be considered responsible and competent. In other words, the law should not require an unrealistically
high or ideal degree of rationality or ability in order to hold people
responsible or competent. Indeed, if we consider the enormous
amount of seemingly foolish, harmful, and otherwise poorly performed behavior we would not dream of preventing, it appears that
the law already makes this assumption. Moreover, a threshold concept is far easier to devise and administer. Setting a low threshold
for responsibility and competence again insures caution before treating any class of people as nonresponsible or incompetent.
None of the four assumptions is inviolable. For example, some
people may be so irrational that depriving them of negative liberty
in order to restore their responsibility and competence might be justified. Indeed, the primary justification for preferring negative liberty is that rational persons best know and can maximize their own

13. A helpful discussion of the distinction between the relativistic and the threshold sense of
competence is, Wikler, Paternalism and the Mildly Retarded, in PATERNALISM 83, 85-91 (R.Sartorius
ed. 1983).
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desires. Nevertheless, strong theoretical and factual reasons would
always be necessary to override the assumptions.
\Vhy should anyone adopt the assumptions that I have enunciated
as the components of a preference for liberty? As stated at the
outset, I cannot provide an uncontroversial conceptual or empirical
foundation for them. But I can ask you to try empathetically to
imagine what society would be like if the law were constrained by
these assumptions . Would more people be happy or satisfied or consider their lives worthwhile than if the law adopted a different vision?
Stated another way, would more people, including the mentally disordered, flourish or be better off? We cannot know; we can only
estimate, but most public policy is based upon such estimations. In
making such an estimation, I believe it is appropriate to adopt the
vantagepoint of late twentieth century Americans, with their values,
predispositions, preferences, and knowledge of themselves and history. Although the Rawlsian vantage point of an ideally rational
observer, unaffected by culture and history, is of course appealing,
it is unlikely to help us make policy m light of who we are and
who we might realistically become.
A final assumption crucial to proper mental health lawmaking
is that the ultimate question in mental health law is always social,
moral, political, and legal. Whether and according to what criteria
people should be considered nonresponsible or incompetent are not
medical, psychiatric, or psychological questions that can be coherently asked and answered in these terms. Mental health scientists
and clinicians may in some instances be able to provide lawmakers
with relevant data concerning the capabilities and behavior of crazy
people, but the normative consequences of crazy behavior are not
medical issues. Therefore, social and legal decisionmakers cannot
abdicate their responsibility to decide normative issues by mistakenly
assuming that the issues are medical rather than moral and legal.
Adopting the assumptions described-a preference for liberty and
treating mental health law issues as legal-does not entail the further
assumption that all adults or classes of adults must be deemed responsible. Some people or classes of people may be so far below
any reasonable threshold that caution will not prevent us from providing for special legal treatment. But if lawmakers take liberty se-
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riously and recognize that t he fundamental iss ues are legal, they must
consider the evidence very carefully and must take responsibility for
making the normative choice to treat crazy perso ns specially. The
basic assumptions surely mean that we cannot differentiate crazy
people simply on the basis of a label, "mental disorder," or on the
basis of the question-begging assumption that "they must be nonresponsible because they're sick." Furthermore, no matter how precisely we define the class of mentally disordered people, there will
be substantial differences among the people in the class that will
require carefully individualized decision making in all legal contexts.
The assumptions also enjoin us to find least restrictive means to
respond to those situations in which we are confident about our
judgments of nonresponsibility. Finally, the assumptions mean that
we should be extremely hesitant to intervene in a person's life against
his or her own wishes and for what we believe to be his or her own
good. If we do intervene paternalistically, we should be certain not
only that the means chosen are the least intrusive, but also that they
are reasonably sure to produce the benefit that the person would
have wanted for him or herself.

III.
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DIFFERENT ARE CRAZY PEOPLE?

The most radical move one can make to support the general
thesis that crazy people are responsible and should not be treated
specially is to claim that mental disorder is a myth, a claim most
famously argued in the provocative work of psychiatrist Thomas
Szasz. 14 Although I agree with some of the conceptual criticisms of
mental health science and many of the political criticisms of mental
health law made by those who consider mental illness a myth, 15 I
do not share their basic premise. Crazy behavior, however one wishes
to conceptualize it, exists, causes suffering and disability, and sometimes may deprive the crazy person of responsibility. Nonetheless,
as a normative matter, the law should design and interpret mental
health laws to assure narrow application. In a society that prefers
liberty, the class of people the law treats specially should be small,

14. T . SZASZ, THE MYTH OF
15. See especially T. SZASZ ,
THE I DEA AND I TS CONSEQUENCES

M ENTAL ILLNESS
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(1974) .

LAW, LIBERTY AND P SYCHIATRY

(1963) and

f

T . SZASZ, I NSANITY:

(1987) .

1
j
·.-11"1.
~-

1987]

TREATING CRAZY PEOPLE

361

and legal decision making should err on the side of responsibility.
No human being is perfectly rational, and all are subject to conditions that on occasion make the choice to behave correctly or
appropriately difficult. Nonetheless, we assume that most of us are
capable of behaving rationally or resisting the desire to behave
wrongly in difficult situations. Although these capabilities vary substantially among normal people, we assume that even the least capable normal person can behave minimally rationally with a
reasonable amount of effort. The informal social and formal legal
criteria for responsibility are not difficult for most people to attain
under most circumstances. Thus, a normal person is considered to
be responsible even if he or she behaves irrationally or is faced with
and yields to most hard choices. By contrast, when crazy people
behave irrationally or are swayed by the hard choices that their
impulses may produce, we assume that they are not capable of behaving rationally or of mastering the desire to behave as their impulses predispose. We believe that anyone who behaves sufficiently
crazily must be incapable of responsible behavior because no one
who could behave otherwise would behave so crazily.
The capability for responsible behavior varies along a continuum.
At the extremes, we can be quite sure of our judgments: the consistently rational person whose every action bespeaks firmness of
self-control is of course capable of responsible behavior, and the
person who behaves consistently and severely crazily is not. The hard
question, as always, for legal policymakers and legal decisionmakers
is where to draw the line. Which class of crazy people and which
individual persons are so crazy that we may justly assume that they
are not capable under any reasonable set of conditions of responsible
behavior? There are no scientific answers to either of these questions, but there is relevant empirical evidence available to inform
normative legal decisionmakers. On the basis of this evidence, I
conclude that the vast majority of crazy people, including many who
are severely crazy, are capable of behaving minimally rationally or
resisting hard choices.
Considering the responsibility of crazy people requires examination of the total range of their behavior, including their noncrazy
behavior, and comparison of it to normal peoples' behavior. Unless
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one does so, it is too easy to conclude that crazy people are uniformiy crazy and cleanly distinguishable from those considered normal. I shall consider the following types of evidence: clinical
observations of crazy people, empirical research comparing crazy
people to normals, and empirical 1 esearch bearing directly on the
rationality and normality of crazy people. If crazy people are not
as different from normal people as one might suppose, and if crazy
people demonstrate a great deal of normal, rational behavior, then
perhaps they are more capable of responsible behavior than we usually assume, and thus the law should treat them less specially.
First, it is a striking clinical commonplace that crazy people,
including the craziest, behave normally much of the time and in
many ways. Even when they are in the midst of a period of crazy
behavior, much of their behavior will be normal. 16 Between crazy
periods, crazy people are not reliably distinguishable from normal
persons. As a general matter, then, crazy people are by no means
constantly crazy, nor are all their behaviors crazy, and even when
behaving crazily, much of their behavior will be normal. Simple
observation thus confirms that even the craziest people retain substantial capability to behave relatively normally.
Nonetheless, some crazy people occasionally may be incapable
of behaving rationally. If one looks at the behavior and life histories
of these people, there is apparently no other way reasonably to construe some of their conduct. But we cannot reach this conclusion
simply because the person is diagnosable and may exhibit substantial
crazy behavior. We must examine the total range of a person's behavior. We assume on the one hand that no one capable of rationality would behave so crazily; but on the other hand, there is
much normal behavior to give us pause. At the least, it is unjustified
to assert that crazy people as a class lack all capability for normal
rational behavior.
Second, much of the empirical research on craziness has attempted to demonstrate that the performance of crazy people and

16. See Lehmann & Cancro, Schizophrenia: Clinical Features, in 4 COMPREHENSIVE TEXTBOOK
OF PsYCHIATRY 680, 681-82 (H. Kaplan & B. Sadock eds. 1985).
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normals differs on a wide variety of variables. For our purposes,
studies that compare crazy people and normals on behavioral tasks
are most relevant because physical and other differen ces are legally
relevant only if expressed in behavior. People who behave rationally
do no t become nonresponsible simply because a physical variable
systematically differentiates the diagnostic class to which they belong
from other classes of responsible and non-diagnosable people . T his
is true even if the physical attribute that distinguishes crazy people
is abnormal according to a coherent biological or medical concept
of abnormality. Rationality, not biological normality, is the touchstone of legal responsibility, and rationality is a behavioral criterion
that is not vitiated merely by the presence of a biological abnormality.
It is impossible to review all the studies that have compared crazy

people and normals, but a recent review reaches what I believe are
still representative results. Two well-respected researchers, Theodore
Sarbin and James Mancuso, reviewed 374 studies of people diagnosed as suffering from schizophrenia that appeared between 1959
and 1978 in The Journal of Abnormal Psychology and its predecessor, The Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology. 17 Sarbin
and Mancuso chose these journals because they are prestigious journals with high standards for accepting manuscripts that publish the
best efforts in the science of abnormal psychology.
Sarbin and Mancuso heavily criticize both the methodology of
many of the studies reviewed and the conceptual status of the category of schizophrenia as a disease. Nonetheless, their most interesting conclusions are those derived from a large group of studies
that accept or at least employ the disease category, schizophrenia,
and that compare the differences in performance between those diagnosed as suffering from schizophrenia and those considered normal. In brief, Sarbin and Mancuso conclude that although there are
small mean differences that favor the normals, "from inspection of
the data, it is abundantly clear that most persons identified as schizophrenics do not function differently from most persons identified

17. T.
51 (1980).

SARBIN

& J.

MANCUSO, SCHIZOPHRENIA: MEDICAL DIAGNOSIS OR MORAL VERDICT?

22-
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as nonschizophrenics. " 18 In other words, the distributions of schizophrenics and nonschizophrenics on the tested variables overlap
substantially. Moreover, the variability of the schizophrenics' scores
is greater than that of the variability of the nonschizophrenics' scores.
Sarbin and Mancuso conclude that ''the single most reliable prediction to be made in studies of schizophrenics and nonschizophrenics" is that "the variability of the scores of schizophrenics will
be observably larger than the variability of the scores of control
samples," and that "most experimental measures have shown that
schizophrenics are very different one from the other." 19 In light of
the overlap of the two populations and the greater variability of the
performance of schizophrenics, Sarbin and Mancuso conclude that
the small differences in sample means do not mean that schizophrenics differ from normals. In sum, "one could not tell the 'sick'
from the 'well' by the scores on the dependent measures [the tested
variables].' ' 20 Moreover, if one subjects the studies from which these
conclusions are drawn to a complete methodological critique, the
conclusion that there are substantial differences becomes weaker still
because there are sufficient flaws to warrant substantial caution about
the conclusions.
The studies Sarbin and Mancuso reviewed dealt only with schizophrenia and used pre-DSM-III criteria 21 for identifying those diagnosed as suffering from schizophrenia. DSM-III's diagnostic
criteria are narrower than those of its predecessors, and thus one
might expect the differences to be greater in studies performed after
the 1980 adoption of DSM-III. On the other hand, many post-1980
studies still use non-DSM-III criteria, and my review of the more
recent literature, although not as complete or systematic as Sarbin
and Mancuso's, provides no reason to believe that their primary

18 . !d. at 47.
19. !d. at 50 (emphasis in original).
20. !d. at 51.
21. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS (3d ed. 1980) [herei nafter DSM-III] includes the diagnostic criteria for all th e menta l
disorders currently identified by the APA. DSM-III's diagnostic criteria are far more explicit than
those of its predecessor, DSM-II (1968). A revised ver sion of the third edition, DIAGNOSTIC AND
STATISTICAL MAN UAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS (Jd ed. rev .) was published in 1987 [hereinafter DSMIII-R]. Publication of DSM-IV is anticipated in the 1990' s.
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conclusions are now invalid. I also suggest that their conclusionssmall mean differences, high intragroup variance, substantial overlap
of distributions-hold for the smaller number of studies that compare other diagnostic groups, such as those suffering from affective
disorders, to normalsY Further, most of the behavioral deficits present in disordered persons are common in normals as well. 23 Finally,
Sarbin and Nlancuso suggest that ''disguised variables'' that were
not and still are not controlled for in most studies could account
for most of the differences that do exist. 24 These disguised variables,
such as socioeconomic status, are not the types of variables that
bear on responsibility. Thus, even if they, rather than mental disorder, account for the measured differences, this would not indicate
that the mentally disordered are distinguishable in legally relevant
ways.
Almost none of the studies Sarbin and Mancuso review or others
to which I refer address differences in genetic, biochemical, neurological, or other biological variables. Recent literature contains
many studies that find such differences and conclude that there are
real biological differences between normals and various types of disordered people. 25 Although many of these studies may have meth22. See, e.g. , Layne, Painful Truths About Depressives' Cognition, 39 J . CLINICAL PsYCHOLOGY
848 (1983). But see, e.g., Dobson & Shaw, 10 CoGNITIVE THERAPY & REs . 13 (1986). Again, the point
is not that there are no differences or that the mentally disordered suffer no deficits; rather, it is
simply that the differences are much less significant than we commonly assume.
23. Harrow & Quinlan, Is Disordered Thinking Unique to Schizophrenia?, 34 ARCHIVES GEN.
PsYCHIATRY 15, 19-21 (1977); Lehmann & Cancro, supra note 14, at 681. Moreover, when schizophrenics show greater thought disorder than normals, in some cases the cognitive defect can be easily
modified, leading to the possible conclusion that thought disorder is not a valid indicator of schizophrenia. K. SALZINGER, ScHIZOPHRENIA: 8EHAVORIAL AsPECTS 64-65 (1973) . See also King & Sheridan,

Problem-Solving Characteristics of Process and Reactive Schizophrenics and Affective-Disordered Patients, 94 J . ABNORMAL PsYCHOLOGY 17 (1985) (study failed to find, contrary to usual finding, that
there are not cognitive deficiencies specific to schizophrenia). The easy modifiability of much thought
disorder also suggests that this type of abnormal thinking may not be beyond the person's rational
control.
24. T. SARBIN & J. MANCUSO, supra note 17 at 52-80.
25. E.g., Egeland, Gerhard, Pauls, Sussex, Kidd, Allen, Hostetter & Housman, Bipolar Affective Disorders Linked to DNA Markers on Chromosome lJ, 325 NATURE 783 (1987); Wong, Wagner, Tune, Dannals, Pearlson, Links, Tamminga, Broussolle, Raver!, Wilson, Young, Malat, Williams,
O'Tuama, Snyder, Kuhar & Gjedde, Positron Emission Tomography Reveals Elevated D 2 Dopamine
Receptors in Drug-Naive Schizophrenics , 234 ScrENCE 1558 (1986) . See also Hodgkinson, Sherrington,
Gurling , Marchbanks, Reeders, Mallet, Mcinnis, Petursson and Brynjolfsson, Molecular GeneticEvidence for Heterogeneity in Manic Depression, 325 NATURE 805 (1987) (evidence for genetic heterogeneity of linkage, rather than a single locus, in manic depression).
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odological flaws or have not yet been repiicated, 26 I ass ume that
valid differences may someday be discovered Y Nevertheless, such
a discovery, even if the distinguishing biological variable were abnormal, would have no necessary relevance for legally or socially
distinguishing crazy people from nor mal sJ~ Biological variables are
not per se the criteria for nonresponsibility . All behavior has some
biological causes. The legal issue, how·ever, is whether the person
is sufficiently nonculpably irrational or compelled. Differences in
biology simply do not bear on responsi bility if the actor behaves
reaso nably rationally and without compulsion. If a person is sufficiently irrational or compelled to warrant special legal treatment,
the failure to discover a biological abnormality does not mean that
the person is responsible.
None of the empirical research discussed above, which compares
crazy people to normals, directly measured rationality and compulsion. Therefore, its relevance in deciding whether the law should
treat crazy people specially is limited. Nonetheless, it suggests that
the behavioral differences between crazy and normal people are less
pronounced than is usually supposed.
A third type of evidence relevant to the law ' s decision to treat
crazy people specially is found in studies that appear to measure
more directly the rationality of crazy people. These studies often
use as subjects hospitalized crazy people, those who are typically
the most crazy. One series of studies deals with "impression man-

26 . E.g., Farde, Wiesel, Hall , Halldin , Stone-Elander & Sed vall, No D, R eceptor In crease in
PET Study of Schizophrenia, 44 ARCHIVES GEN. PsYCHIATRY 671 (1987) (a team of Scandinavian
researchers using equivalent methodology were unabl e to replicate the findings of Wong et al, supra
note 23).
Despite increasing sophistication, " disguised" va riables often are not co ntrolled ; studies use different diagnostic criteria for th e same disorder, rendering the studies noncom parable; and there are
still studies without sufficient reliability checks on the diagnosis of the disordered group. Further,
eve n if the disordered subjects are reliably distinguis hed from normals for research purposes, the
validity of the diagnostic categories is no t established. DSM-111-R. supra note 19, at xxiv. It is not
clear, th erefore, that measurable differences measure the differences bet ween normals and those suffering from a "real'' disorder.
27. But see R . LEWONTIN, S. RosE & L KAMIN, NoT IN OuR GENES (1984) (reviewi ng the
evidence for biological causation of a wide range of behaviors, including intelligence and schizophrenia,
and concluding that the widely assumed biological determinist case is unproven now and is unlikely
to be proven in the future).
28. See Morse, supra note 6, at 48-50, 7 1-76.
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agement,'' the ability of people to manipulate their own behavior
to attain their goals. 29 In the case of disordered people, researchers
studied hospitalized patients' attempts to vary their degree of craziness in order to manipulate hospital personnel. For example, many
mental patients, even quite crazy ones, are able to convince hospital
staff that they are either more or less crazy in order to remain in
hospital, to gain privileges, or to be released. 30
Some patients who engage in impression management may be
unaware of their manipulations, a possibility that has led commentators to claim with some justification that such unselfconscious behavior is not evidence of a patient's ability to cope rationally with
the environment. Even if some patients lack such awareness, a not
unreasonable supposition, this argument proves too much. The inability to be aware of or correctly to identify one's "real" reasons
for action is endemic among people generally 31 and is hardly evidence
of irrationality. There is no convincing evidence that crazy people
especially lack the ability correctly to identify their "true" reasons
for action. Even if they do, the class of people considered irrational
would expand considerably if the lack of ability to know one's "real"
reasons for action was a criterion for rationality. Indeed, some researchers claim that awareness and correct identification of the causes
for one's actions are much rarer than we assumeY The unselfconscious ability to manipulate the environment successfully might
be a sign of high social competence. Finally, it is simply not clear
in impression management studies that the patients are unaware of
what they are doing; much of the behavior is consistent primarily
with the hypothesis that they are aware of their manipulations. The
phrase chosen to describe the behavior, "impression management,"
connotes conscious and rational reasons for action.

29.

B. SCHLENKER, IMPRESSION MANAGEMENT: THE SELF-CONCEPT , SOClAL IDENTITY AND I N-

TERPERSONAL RELATIONS

(1980).

& R . RING, METHODS OF MADNESS : THE MENTAL HOSPITAL
49-74 (1969).
31. R. NISBETT & L. Ross, HUMAN INFERENCE: STRATEGIES AND SHORTCOMINGS OF SOClAL J UDGMENT (1980); Wilson , Self-Deception Without Repression: Limits on Access to Mental States, in SELFD ECEPTION AND SELF-UNDERSTANDING 95, 99-101 (M. Martin , ed. 1985).
32. !d. ; Nisbett & Wil son, Telling More Than We Know: Verbal Reports on ]\ifenta/ Processes,
84 PSYCHOLOGICAL RE V. 231 (1977).

30.

B. BRAGINSKY, D. BRAGINSKY
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Other research bearing on th e rationality of crazy people invo lves
" token economies," behavior modification regimes wherein subjects-mental patients in this case-are rewarded for approved behavior by being given tokens such as points or poker chips Y The
tokens can then be used to purchase desired goods or increased
privileges. Token economies are often effective; patients do change
their behavior in planned, desired ways. Although derived from and
cast in the theoretical terms of behavioral psychology, token economies can also be characterized as positing a rational, economic
theory of human behavior. Studies of the operation of economic
principles in these programs have found that patients respond to
changes in relative prices and wages as economic theory predicts
that rational, normal people respond; that is, patients conform to
rational choice models by maximizing their expected utilities. 34 The
effectiveness of token economies and their conformity to "rational
person" economic models is further evidence that crazy people are
capable of behaving rationally and that they respond to the same
incentives as normal people. One must be careful about claiming
too much on the basis of these studies because infrahuman species
have also been shown experimentally to behave economically "rationally. " 35 Studies of human subjects, however, do demonstrate
mental patients' quite substantial capacity for rational, rule-following behavior.
Less rigorous observations in mental hospitals of patient management and governance programs provide related evidence about
patients' capability to act rationally. Wards without token economy
programs also have rules and procedures that patients are expected
to follow; patients are expected to understand the rules and to play
by them. If a patient who begins to threaten violent conduct is
warned that she will be put in seclusion unless she calms down, the

33.

N. AzRIN, THE TOKEN ECONOMY: A MOTIVATIONAL SYSTEM FOR THERAPY AND
(1968).
34. Fisher, Winkler, Krasner , Kagel, Battalio & Basmann , Implications for Concepts of Psychopathology of Studies of Economic Principles in Behavior Therapy, 166 J . N ERvous & MENTAL
DI SEASE 187, 191-93 (1978).
35 . Kagel, Rac hlin, Green, Battalio, Basmann & Klemm , Experimental Studies of Consumer
Demand Behavior Using Laboratory Animals, 13 EcoN. INQUIRY 22 (1975).
T. AYLLON &
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staff member is treating the patient as a rational maximizer. Similarly, patient self-governance programs assume that patients are capable of setting and enforcing the behavioral rules . Patients do indeed
understand and play by the rules; otherwise, ward management would
be impossible.
The final type of evidence that is directly relevant to crazy peoples' capability for rational action is found in studies of the behavior
of disordered people in a variety of real world contexts, such as
driving, holding jobs, managing finances, and responding to situations eliciting altruism. 36 The general outcome of these studies is
consistent with the results of research on "laboratory" tasks. Crazy
people are better able to perform real world tasks than we usually
assume, and their behavior is often indistinguishable from the behavior of normal peopleY Further, studies of social skills training
demonstrate that socially disabled crazy people can learn to be socially competent. 38
In sum, a great deal of evidence indicates that crazy people are
capable of behaving rationally and that their behavioral capabilities
are not as different from those of normals as we commonly believe.
I do not contend that people who are considered crazy, especially
those considered very crazy, are not different from people who are
considered normal. Some crazy people do seem totally or near totally
different. It is simply unbelievable to most observers that people

36. E.g., Armstrong & Whitlock, Mental I!!ness and Road Traffic Accidents, 14 Ausn. & N.Z.
J. PSYCffiATRY 53 (1980); Vecchione v. Wohlgemuth, 377 F. Supp. 1361, 1367-69 (E.D. Pa. 1974)
(mental disorder not inconsistent with competence to manage finances); Howard, The Ex-Mental
Patient as an Employee: An On-the-Job Evaluation, 45 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 479 (1975); Tolar,
Kell y & Stebbins, Altruism in Psychiatric Patients: How SociallyConcerned Are the Emotionally Disturbed?, 44 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PsYCHOLOGY 503 (1976) (in a devised situation that subjects
thought was real, psychiatric patients demonstrated more altruism than normals; no differences found
in a paper and pencil task).
37. See 1 in 5 Adults Lacks Basic Living Ski!!s, L.A. Times, Oct. 30, 1975, pt. 1 at I, col.
I (reporting a large-scale University of Texas study). I am not claiming that all mentally disordered
people are competent and that a larger percentage of normals than crazy people is not. Once again,
the claim is simply that the disordered are far less distinguishable than is usually believed.
38. Brady, Behavior Therapy, 4 COMPREHENSIVE TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY 1365, 1372-73 (H.
Kaplan & B. Sadock eds. 1985); Brown & Munford, Life Ski//s Training for Chronic Schizophrenics,
171 J. NERvous & MENTAL DISEASE 466 (1983); Hansen, St. Lawrence & Christoff, Effects of In-

terpersonal Problem-Solving Training With Chronic After-care Patients on Problem-Solving Component Skills and Effectiveness of Solutions, 53 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY 167 (1985).
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who are delusional and wildly out of touch with reality, for example ,
are capable of behaving rationally when their behavior is affected
by the delu sions. On the other hand, even in cases of the most
extreme disorder , we cannot be certain that such people are incapa ble of minimal rationality (althoug h it mi ght take great effort for
them to behave ration ally). In the case of most crazy people , the
evidence supporting bro ad claims a bout their incapacity to behave
rati onally is equivocal-little mo re than an intuitive hunch.
Again, I do not mean to make an absurd claim. A chronically
disabled, hallucinating, and delusional person who wanders the streets
in rags speaking gibberish is not " like" normal persons, and the
law should probably treat this person specially. Nevertheless , the
law should be far more cautious before concluding that large numbers of crazy people are so incapable of responsible behavior that
deprivation of liberty is justified.
I am trying to shift the burden of persuasion on this issue. If
we simply assume what ' 'everyone'' assumes-that crazy people are
generally incapable of responsible behavior-then we do not need
evidence or arguments to support this assumption as a predicate for
social and legal policy. I am suggesting, however, that in this case,
the common wisdom is supported primarily by intuition and assertion. Contrary evidence and arguments do exist. Such contrary data
and arguments do not prove that the common wisdom is wrong and
that almost all crazy people should be treated just like everyone else.
The common wisdom is not scientifically proven, however, and society and the law should hesitate before acting on it. If we wish to
treat crazy people differently, let us do so honestly, without pseudoscientific rationalizations. Furthermore, as the next section will
suggest, rather than treating crazy people as different and "other"
we should redefine our expectations and many institutions to facilitate the integration of crazy people into the mainstream of society.
IV.
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NORMATIVE S U GGESTIONS FOR NORMAL TREATMENT OF CRAZY
PEOPLE

Let us assume, as we now do , that substantial numbers of crazy
people are incapable of behaving rationally and that the law is con-
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sequently prima facie justified in treating at least some of them
specially. Even so, there are good reasons and better methods for
treating crazy people less specially than their "differentness" might
theoretically permit. The methods and arrangements that I propose
will not be utopian and cost-free. \Vhen we consider social change,
and especially when we resist it , it is easy to forget that no social
policies, including the present ones, are ideal. If the law treats crazy
people less specially, some will be forced to suffer consequences of
their craziness that we should not wish them to bear. A truly unfair
contract may be enforced; a desperately needy person may not receive treatment. On the other hand, present policies brand an entire
class of people as unworthy of the full responsibilities of autonomous personhood, fail to achieve their stated purposes, and in an
enormous number of specific cases, incorrectly deprive people of
liberty or deem them nonresponsible.
Confronting honestly the costs of present arrangements is especially useful when special legal treatment is paternalistically premised. We should not intervene in the lives of others for their own
good, especially if doing so requires substantial intrusions on liberty ,
unless we can be quite sure that we will actually improve the lot of
those we aim to help. 39 Good motives should not lull us into complacency about the benign consequences of paternalistic action; instead, we should be skeptical about whether we have done the best
we can. We should be especially skeptical about the priority of our
motives when we are dealing with a class of people, such as the
mentally disordered, who are feared and despised more often than
they are treated with sympathy and concern.
With these general considerations in mind, let us turn to specific
suggestions for treating crazy people less specially. Our society generally prefers maximizing liberty, even at the cost of increased social
danger and other social harms. For instance, our criminal justice
system favors incorrect acquittals to incorrect convictions, and the
length of a prison term is limited by the offender's desert. Consequently, dangerous and guilty defendants are acquitted, and clearly

39. See J.

KLEINJG,

supra note II, at 74-77 .
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dangerous pnsoners are released at the end of their pnson terms.

I

In effect, our society and the law have decided that liberty is
worth substantial social risks. I believe we should adopt this attitude
more extensively in our treatment of crazy people.Most mental health
professionals and legal policymakers, including the majority of those
who are most paternalistic , favor substantial liberties and legal protections for crazy people. Nevertheless, I think the law can "take
more risks" with crazy people at far less cost than we are willing
to bear in other contexts such as the criminal law. The degree of
risk that society should be willing to accept might vary from one
mental health law context to another; the policies underlying laws
regulating competence to contract, on the one hand, and involuntary
commitment, on the other, for example, may require different results. But the preference should always be for less special treatment
and more risks.

r

The law's related assumptions that crazy people cannot fully appreciate liberty and that their problems are primarily medical or
psychiatric have led to uncreative responses to the social problems
that crazy behavior produces. If the law focused more strongly on
protecting and promoting the liberty of crazy persons, more creative
social solutions might result. For example, some people are homeless
because mental disorder renders them incompetent to manage the
simplest affairs of everyday life. Although homeless people are not
all crazy and some who are crazy are not homeless because they are
crazy, some cases of homelessness are produced primarily by craziness.40
Until about twenty-five years ago, the traditional viewpoint was
that homelessness among the mentally disordered was primarily a
medical problem that should be solved by committing the person-

40 . All the homeless are not menta lly disordered and the causes of homelessness are hardly
clear, but it is virtually certain that some small fraction of the disordered homeless are homeless
primarily, if not entirely, because of disabilities stemming from their disorder. See C. KIESLER & A.
SIBULKJN, MENTAL HOSPITALIZATION : MYTHS AND fACTS ABOUT A NATIONAL CRISIS 199-202(1987) (good
data on the homeless are surprisingly sparse ; estimates of the percentage of hom eless who are mentally
disordered vary widely; common assumption that homelessness a m o ng the mentall y disordered is
produced by deinstitutionalization is incorrect) .
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involuntarily to a mental hospital. 41 But we can also treat homelessness as an essentially socioeconomic problem and we should
remember that a hospital is not a home. There are not many rich
crazy homeless people because the wealthy have the resources to
permit adequate care and treatment without inpatient hos pitalization. Few rich crazy persons are sleeping on inner city subway grates.
Indeed, it is possible with proper allocation of resources and creative
community institutions to treat adequately almost all mental patients
without hospitalization or with brief hospitalization at most.-~ 2 Now,
if involuntary hospitalization, especially on a long-term basis, is difficult to accomplish, society will be forced generally to attempt the
less intrusive alternatives that now are readily available only to
wealthier people or in a few fortunate communities 43 (or to admit
its hypocrisy about claims about caring for poor mentally disordered
people). My point is not that this is the appropriate response to this
particular problem, although I think it is; rather, the limited point
is that a sincere desire to treat crazy people less specially can often
produce a successful social and legal solution with less deprivation
of liberty. At the very least, if we know that less intrusive solutions
are possible , it is more difficult to assume that an intrusive mental
health law is justified, even if we ultimately adopt it.
Focusing on treating crazy people less specially can produce a
desirable shift in social and legal policy by causing reconsideration
of the determinants of competence. Most mental health laws deprive
a person of liberty or autonomy because the person is incompetent,
broadly speaking, to perform one task or another. In the case of
crazy people, we assume that an intrapersonal variable, craziness,
produces the incompetence, but this is an oversimplification. A per-

41. Westermeyer, Public Health and Chronic Mental I!!ness, 77 AM . J. PuBLIC HEALTH 667
(1987).
42. C. KIES LER & A. SmuLKIN, supra note 40, at 152-80. A recent feasibility study concluded
that Vermont could dismantle its state hospital system entirely and improve the population's quality
of mental health care through the use of community-based treatment. Carling , Miller, Daniels &
Randolph, A State Mental Health System With No State Hospital; The Vermont Feasibility Study,
38 HosP. & CoMMUNITY PsYCHtATRY 617 (1987) . But see also, Kincheloe & Ettlinger, Commentary:
A False Dichotomy, 38 HosP. & CoMMUNITY PsYCHtATRY 623 (1987) .
43. See S. EsTROFF, MAKING IT CRAZY: AN ETHNOGRAPHY OF PsYCHtATRIC CLIENTS IN AN AMERICA N CoMMUN ITY (1981), for an extensive description of a successful program of community care .
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son ' s competence to perform any task is clearly a product of the
interaction between the person's cognitive and physical abilities, the
inherent difficulty of the task, and situational variables that may
affect either the person's abilities or the difficulty of the task. Virtually anyone, no matter how personally capable, can be rendered
incompetent to do anything if he or she is placed under sufficient
kinds of the appropriate stress. Conversely, even extremely "incompetent'' persons can be made more competent by a combination of
personal supports and by redesigning or redefining the necessary
tasks. 44 For example, physically handicapped persons are able to
fulfill the demands of otherwise impossible roles if they are given
various forms of rehabilitation and if the environment is redesigned
to allow performance of those roles. If office buildings are made
accessible to those in wheelchairs, physically handicapped persons
may be able to hold jobs not previously available to them. The
situation is similar for many mentally disordered people. Provision
of social skills training and social supports to simplify life tasks can
enable seemingly disabled people to live reasonably independent
lives. 45
Replying simply that such suggestions are unrealistic or that they
presuppose an inappropriate definition of a task or an environment
begs the question. One may properly argue that society should not
spend the resources to ensure lives of greater liberty and independence for crazy people because such resources would be better spent
in other ways. Or one may suggest that the present set of social
expectations or arrangements is justified on (specified) normative
grounds. But it is misleading to claim that only one set of solutions
is feasible or "proper."
Too often social tradeoffs and normative justifications are overtly
or covertly hidden behind unjustified assertions of the latter type.
For example, group homes attended by social service personnel might
enable many crazy people to lead lives of reasonable liberty and
dignity in the community. Perhaps we do not wish to pay the short
term capital and other costs of constructing such homes in decent

44. See Minow, supra note 5, at 184-87.
45. Jd.; C. KIESLER & A. SIBULKIN, supra note 40, at 152-80.
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areas because we would rather spend the money elsewhere or perhaps
we do not wish such homes in "our" neighborhoods, even if they
are affordable. If so, let us openly admit these reasons, let us admit
we prefer to exclude the disordered as "other," rather than hiding
behind the rationalizations that we sim ply cannot afford such homes,
that they cannot succeed, or that hospitals are the appropriate places
for "sick" people.
Less intrusive means for solving social problems created by mental disorder will routinely be available and may often be cheaper
than more legally intrusive methods. In the long run , group homes
will be cheaper than hospitals, for example. 46 Nonetheless, a vision
of the problems that assumes the validity or inevitability of present
responses will diminish the possibility of discovering and designing
responses that enhance freedom and achieve other social goals, including the integration into society of the mentally disordered. 47
Another reason to limit differential treatment of crazy and normal people is that broad mental health laws are often used inappropriately and indirectly to achieve allegedly desirable results by
unjustifiably permitting normal people to be deprived of autonomy
or to evade responsibility on grounds of craziness. 48 For example,
assume a wealthy decedent left all her money to a ''fringe'' organization and impoverished her "deserving" family. 49 Such a will would
strike many people as unfair to the family, but how can the law
prevent this disposition of the property in the face of the strong
social policy favoring testamentary independence? A classic means

46. See C . KIESLER & A. SIBULKIN, supra note 40, at 179.
47. Allocating resources for special services for mentally disabled people may seem inconsistent
with the argument in Section III that the law should not treat disordered people as specially as it
now does. The possible asymmetry is not troubling, however, because the justification for disadvantageous special treatment ought to be far weightier than the justification for humane special treatment
of needy people . Some might argue that present special legal treatment, such as involuntary commitment, is generally advantageous to disordered people, but as I have tried to demonstrate in this
article and elsewhere, this argument is unpers uasive. See, e.g., Morse, A Preference for Liberty: The
Case Against Involuntary Commitment of the Mentally Disordered, 70 CAL. L. REv. 54 (1982) .
48. The classic analysis of this problem is Green , Proof of Mental Incompetency and the Unexpressed Major Premise , 53 YALE L.J. 271 (1944).
49 . This was the situation in In re Strittmater's Estate , 140 N.J . Eq . 94, 53 A.2d 205 (1947),
where the ardentl y feminist decedent left all her money to a radical feminist organization. Needless
to say, the relatives tried to break the will.
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for invalidating such wills is to find on the basis of psychiatric testimony that the testator was incompetent to make a will.S 0 The law
may then reach the preferred result without qu est ioning the general
policy, but doing so involves a dishonest and degrading legal fiction.
If we wish to override testamentary independence on distributional
or justice grounds, we should face this issue and pass appropriate
laws.
Now consider the following example of how mental disorder may
be used illegitimately to evade responsibility. 51 Suppose that a businessperson fail s to file federal income tax returns for a number of
years. Assume that she has a hitherto unblemished record and that
she was the sole support of her model family. Assume further that
she was under a great deal of financial strain and intentionally decided to chance not filing the returns. In this case, criminal prosecution for tax evasion is fully justified but not appealing; the
potential defendant has no record, is an otherwise productive member of the community, is the sole support of her family, and has
the resources to mount a defense that will be both difficult and
expensive for the government to overcome. Failing to prosecute on
those grounds is an admission of the disparities in treatment the law
metes out to the rich and poor. If the defendant can claim that the
strains on her produced mental disorder, then this nice middle-class
person and her family and friends need not consider it a case of
dishonesty, and the IRS has a more class-neutral ground for pursuing civil rather than criminal remedies. Once again, however, this
solution allows society to avoid facing the hard question of prosecutorial policy that is really involved. If our general social and legal
policy is questionable, it should be questioned directly and not evaded
by using a claim of mental disorder to reach the preferred result in
the individual case.
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A final suggestion for treating crazy people less specially applies
when the law acts paternalistically, that is, when the law forcibly
intervenes primarily for the good of the mentally disordered person.

50. The judge in Strittmater did exactly this, finding that th e decedent's radical feminist views
were a product of mental disorder.
5!. The followin g example is based on a real case from my consu lting practi ce .
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I suggested earlier and more generally that we should be very cautious before intervening paternalisticallyY In additi on, when the law
decides that paternalistic action is justified, it should ap ply a subjective sta ndard for the substitution of judgment Y A subjective standard requires the decisionmaker to ascertain and order what the
crazy perso n would have decid ed and done for himself or herself
under the circumstances if he or she had been acting competently.
By contrast , the objective standard asks the decisionmaker to ascertain and order the course of harm-preventing or good-promoting
action that a hypothetical reasonable person would have chosen. The
subjective standard is preferable because it does not impose possibly
alien values upon the crazy person and thus is a less objectionable
intrusion on liberty and dignity. T he subjective standa rd respects the
integrity of th e person 's reasonably settled values, preferences, and
goals. Most persons in a free society would prefer that when others
act for us, they should do for us what we would do for ourselves.
Making the subjective determination may be difficult, because
the crazy person seldom will have given prior specific indication of
what he or she would do under specific circumstances, especially if
he or she has not previously encountered those circumstances. This
objection is unconvincing, however , because there often will be specific indication of the person's wishes. Even if there is no such
indication, empathetic identification with the person should help the
decisionmaker to reconstruct the person's value preferences and to
predict what he or she would have decided. 54 If there is insufficient
evidence of what the person's preferences would have been under
the circumstances, the decisionmaker must apply the objective standard. But the subjective standard should not be rejected in individual
cases because the person's identifiably settled preferences, expressed
at a time when he or she was responsible, seem odd, idiosyncratic,

52. See supra text accompanying notes 8-13.
53 . See D. VANDEVEER, PATERNALISTIC INTERVENTION: THE MORAL BOUNDS OF BENEVOLENCE
390-93 (1986) (disc ussi ng the various standards for su bstitution of judgment). Only a brief sketch of
this very complicated issue is possible here.
54 . But see D wor kin , Autonomy and the Demented Self, 64 MILBANK Q . 4, 13- 14 (1986) (arguing
that spec ul ation about what an inc ompetent perso n wo uld have preferred u nder assumed co nd it ions
of competence may be relevant to determining the perso n 's best interests, but that suc h speculation
is not a proper foundation fo r respecting autonomy) .
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or strange. In a pluralistic, liberty-preferring polity, we must respect
each other's preferences, even if we disagree with them.
Applying the subjective standard is more expensive and timeconsuming, but the decreased intrusion on the person's life justifies
the cost. If the subjective standard is too costly, we should be even
more cautious about behaving paternalistically. The intrusion is
enormous, and we greatly risk not improving the crazy person's lot
according to his or her own standards. At the least, we should recognize and justify the costs of acting paternalistically on an objective
basis.
One may question pleas for the expenditure of effort , time, and
money to treat crazy people less specially by pointing to our policies
toward children. Because minors as a class are considered less rational and responsible than adults, few people object to systematically special legal treatment of children. If one analogizes people
under the sway of craziness to minors on the ground that immaturity
and craziness similarly render people incompetent, it may seem that
differential legal treatment is also justified for crazy people.
But minors and crazy adults are different in crucial respects.
First, virtually all crazy people will have shown for substantial portions of their adult lives the capacity for full legal responsibility and
competence. Second, they will have achieved both the wisdom that
experience teaches-at least to the extent that anyone achieves such
wisdom simply by the passage of time-and the longer time-horizons
that development provides. Children do not achieve these conditions
by definition, and there is little reason to believe crazy adults achieve
them substantially less than normal adults.
Third, we can discern an adult's settled preferences and values
with reasonable confidence, but children's preferences and values
are less formed and in flux. Fourth, paternalistic intervention with
children largely takes place under the direction of parents and parent-substitutes such as teachers who can generally be trusted to act
in the child's best interests. By contrast , strangers and state representatives perform most of the paternalistic intervention in the lives
of adults. Sociological and historical studies show that paternalism
by strangers is rarely motivated by the subject's best interests and
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is far more likely to lead to harm. 55 Indeed, when conflict arises m
intimate relations-vvhen family members become "strangers" to
some degree, for example-we least trust paternalistic motives even
in such contexts. Fifth and last, even children are often treated less
paternalistica liy when their importan t in terests, such as procreation 56
and free speech, 57 are in issue, and liberty and autonomy are especially important interests for adults . 58
In sum, my plea is for liberty, creativity, and honesty in men tal
health law policymaking and a djudication. Even if very crazy people
are somewhat less responsible than normal p eople, the lavv' sho uld
try to preserve their li berty, autonomy, dignity, and integratio n in
the commu nity as much as possible consistent with sound social
policy. The law should consider and pursue nonmedical and less
intrusive legal alternatives that treat crazy people less differently.
Intrusive mental health laws should be drafted narrowly to a pply
only to the smallest subset of the disordered for whom such laws
are absolutely necessary. Finally, social policy trade-offs and dilemmas should be faced honestly and directly rather than evaded by
assuming that only genera l medical solutions are possible or by accepting bogus claims of mental di so rder in order to reach preferred
results in individual cases .

55. Douglas, Cooperative Paternalism versus Conflictf ul Paternalism , in PATERNALISM J 7 1, 17580 (R. Sartorius ed. 1983).
56. Carey v. Population Serv. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth,
~28 U.S. 52 (1976); but see H.L. v. Matheson. 450 U.S. 398 (1981).
57. Tinker v. Des Mo ines ind ep . Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1 969) . Bur see Haze lw ood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 108 S. Ct. 562 (1988).
58. In Parham v . 1 .R. , 442 U.S. 584 (1979), the Supreme Court held that no adversar ial pro..::ess
is necessary when minors are placed in mcm al ho spitals by their parents or guardians. Due process
for the com mitment is satisfi ed by the exe rcise of th e professional judgment of the admitting phys ician.
Thi s decision places minimal constraints on paternalistic intervention in the li ves of c hil dren when
their physical liberty an d autonomy are at sta ke, and is therefore a count erexampl e to the te.\tu ai
di sc ussion. On the other hand, some state co urts th at have co nsid ered the issue have recogni zed that
min o rs, espec ially olde r minors, deserve substantial procedural protection before their parents or
guardians may commit th~ m to mental ho spitals. In re Roger S, 19 Cal. 3d 92 1, 569 P .2d 1286, 141
Cal. Rptr. 298 (1977). Furthermore, in recognition of the co mpetence of o lder min ors, many state
statutes allow them to give independent informed consent to the receipt of specific or genera l medical
services. Finally, many of the Court's empirical assu mption s that grounded the decision in Parham
were erroneous . l'vlelton, Fam ily and Jvferua! Hospital as Myths: Civil Commitmeni of Afinors, in
CHILDREN, MENTAL HEALTH AND TH E LAW 15 1 (N. Reppucci. L. Weit horn, E. Mulv ey & J. Monahan,
eds . 1984).
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V.

PROCEDURAL POLICIES

It is difficult to formulate general procedural policies because

the procedural aspects of mental health law vary from context to
context. The procedural requirements of an insanity defense trial in
a capital case are different from those in a social security disability
hearing. Nonetheless, a few pertinent general suggestions are in order.
Most important, the law should consistently treat mental health
cases as serious legal cases that raise social, moral, and political
issues. Legal formality should be preferred to informality or nonlegal
decisionmaking, and full adversarial adjudication should be used
when appropriate. Too often, mental health law cases are treated
as essentially medical and, consequently, are not taken seriously.
The allegedly crazy person is poor, powerless, and underrepresented;
and the proceedings are far too informal to generate a full, individualized airing of the important issues involved. Involuntary commitment proceedings, in which the allegedly crazy person can be
deprived of his or her liberty for substantial periods of time, provide
a good example. These proceedings are typically brief and informal:
the lay witnesses necessary for full evaluation of the case rarely
testify; the allegedly crazy person even more rarely has an expert
of his or her own; and the defense lawyers typically do not prosecute
these cases with the "warm zeal" that the canons of ethics require. 59
An involuntary commitment trial need not be as procedurally encumbered as a criminal trial, but it should be as fully adversarial
as, for example, a commercial claim for money damages.
Procedural formality is often viewed as an unjustified hindrance
to achieving the essentially medical purposes of mental health law. 60
We have seen already, however, that no mental health law adjudicates essentially medical questions; all are concerned with fundamental moral, social, political and, ultimately, legal issues. Thus,
all must be taken legally seriously. Moreover, in those contexts such

59. C. WARREN, THE COURT OF LAST RESORT: MENTAL ILLNESS
(1982); Morse, A Preference for Liberty, supra note 47, at 76-79 .
60. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 428-30, 432 (1979).
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as involuntary commitment, in which the allegedly crazy person rarely
has the resources to mount a full adversary presentation, there is
great danger. Disfavored minorities, such as the mentally disordered,
are far more likely to be the victims of prejudice in informal rather
than formal proceedings. 61 Failure to individualize by reasonably adversary procedures dehumanizes the disordered person and increases
the probability of incorrect decisions.
In recent years, however, the United States Supreme Court has
demonstrated a disquieting readiness to treat mental health law questions as essentially medical and to refuse to impose the fullest possi ble procedural protections simply because the Court believes,
mistakenly, that the issue at stake is medical. The trend began in
Addington v. Texas, 62 in which the Court declined to impose on the
state the burden of persuasion beyond a reasonable doubt in indefinite-term involuntary commitment cases. The Court asserted that
the issues were primarily medical and depended upon expert interpretation of the facts. But whether a person's conduct and mental
condition justify the involuntary deprivation of liberty is not a medical issue .
In Parham v. J.R., 63 the Supreme Court deviated from a series
of cases granting juveniles extensive due process protections. The
Court held that when parents wish to commit their children to mental hospitals, due process is satisfied if the hospital's mental health
professional agrees that hospitalization is justified. The Court was
willing to limit a juvenile's rights not only, or even primarily, because parental rights were at issue-parental rights were at issue in
procreation cases, too-but because the Court viewed the commitment of minors as a medical issue. The Court asserted that there
was little reason to believe judges were better adjudicators of essentially medical questions than mental health professionals, and
thus it deprived children of neutral, independent decisionmakers.

61.
Prejudice
62.
63.

Delgado, Dunn, Brown, Lee & Hubbert, Fairness and Formality: Minimizing the Risk of
in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1985 Wrs. L. REv. 1359, 1387-9 1.
Addington, 441 U.S. 41 8.
Parham , 442 U.S. 584.
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But, again, whether a child can be totally deprived of liberty and
stigmatized cannot be solely a medical question. 64
In Youn gberg v. Romeo ,65 the Court considered the substanti ve
rights to libert y, safety , and habilitation of retarded inmates of a
state institution and held that the state acted properly to protect
those rights as long as professional judgment was exercised in managing the institution and devising individual treatment plans . A lthough Youngberg is not a procedural case, it essentially converted
legal questions about the scope of patients' rights into questions that
could be decided by mental health professionals on the basis of th eir
mental health judgment.
Most recently , in Allen v. Illinois, 66 the Court considered whether
the fifth amendment guaranteed a defendant in a quasi-criminal,
sexual dangerousness commitment proceeding the right to remain
silent. The Court held that because the purpose of the proceedings
was to provide treatment, the usual protections of the criminal justice system need not apply. The Court disapproved of any unnecessary hindrances to ascertaining and interpreting the facts necessary
to make what it viewed as primarily a medical decision. Once again,
however, it is an error to decide the case by label rather than by
serious consideration of what is at stake legally and politically. My
point is not that the decision was necessarily wrong, although once
again I think the decision was mistaken; it is simply that it is based
on a mistakenly medical premise.
The central themes underlying all these opinions are that mental
health law cases raise primarily medical or psychiatric issues, that
strict procedural formalities are an unjustified obstacle to proper
resolutions of the issues, and that mental health professionals are
the best sources of providing and interpreting the facts and even of
deciding the issues. These cases are unsettling because they reflect
at the highest level a basic misunderstanding of the issues and be-
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64. As is so often true in mental health cases, the Court ba sed its opinion on a number o f
factual assumptions that are simply unsupportable . See supra note 58.
65. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U .S. 307 (1982).

66 . Allen v. Illinois, 106 S. Ct. 2988 (1986) .
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cause their outcomes are certain to decrease the welfare of mentally
disordered people. In all contexts in which mentally disordered people are strangers, reducing the procedural barriers to treating them
specially will ensure that the y are treated specially in a more negati ve
way.
To be more specific, allegedly crazy people should be represented
in all contexts by counsel who should seek to accomplish what the
client wishes, or, if the clients' wishes are unclear, to prevent intrusion on the clients' liberty. Some might argue that this will prevent the allegedly crazy person from receiving needed care, treatment,
or protection from physical, financial, or social ruin. But an adversary system is premised on the assumption that the truth is best
determined by a fully adversarial airing of the issues, and there is
no reason to believe that the theory is less applicable in mental health
cases. It is the duty of the state or any other party alleging that a
person is crazy to prove that the criteria for the application of mental
health laws are satisfied. In relatively clear cases, the moving party
will be able to do so, even if it is opposed by active, competent
adversary counsel. In less clear cases, good attorneys may cause the
system to err by underapplying mental health laws. In unclear cases,
however, this is precisely the preferable error in a society that prefers
liberty and the presumption of personal responsibility. Indeed, the
consequences of erroneous overapplication of mental health lawsdeprivation of liberty, autonomy, and dignity-are the most serious
that our legal system can produce. Finally, counsel who follow their
clients' wishes respect the autonomy and dignity of their clients. This
is how lawyers should behave, even if they believe that the clients'
choices are wrong. If lawyers acted in all cases as they do in mental
health cases, few clients would be represented well, because to represent clients effectively, lawyers must often actively argue positions
with which they disagree.
In addition to requiring full adversarial representation by lawyers
on both sides, mental health law cases should be decided primarily
by judges, rather than by panels of laypersons or by mental health
experts. Society can choose to delegate decisionmaking authority in
such cases, but doing so would be a mistake. Judges can also conflate medical and legal issues, but they are best situated by training ,
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experience, and role definition to be neutral decisionmakers who
recognize the moral and political nature of their legal tasks. Once
again, the ultimate issues in mental health cases are not medical or
scientific, and mental health professionals are not expert on the formal resolution of nonmedical issues. Society should not delegate
essentially legal tasks to nonlegal decisionmakers. Additionally, as
noted before, decreased formality in a decisionmaking process may
cut time and cost, but only at the counteracting cost of substantially
increasing the risk of prejudice toward disfavored minorities. The
integrity of legal decisionmaking and the welfare of the disordered
require that mental health cases should be decided by judges or other
neutral legal decisionmakers.
Allegedly crazy people must also have access to mental health
experts of their own, especially if the law fails to reform the rules
and procedures for evaluating legal craziness. The United States Supreme Court recently ruled in Ake v. Oklahoma 67 that criminal defendants with a colorable claim of legal insanity were entitled to the
services of a mental health professional to aid their defense, but
this is not required in many mental health law contexts, including
involuntary commitment and conservatorship proceedings. An allegedly crazy wealthy person can of course hire an expert, but an
allegedly crazy indigent person cannot obtain the assistance of an
independent professional unless the state pays for it. Because courts
routinely view the issues as largely medical and defer to the sole
expert that the state retains, it is crucial in proceedings where liberty
is at stake for the allegedly crazy person to have his or her own
witness. Providing advocate experts in the appropriate contexts will
be expensive and may even encourage the battle of the experts, but
these are the inevitable costs of deciding to treat crazy people specially to the detriment of their liberty and autonomy. If the scope
of expert testimony is limited by relying on observations rather than
on irrelevant diagnostic and legal conclusions, 68 the provision of ad-

67. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985).
68. Morse, Crazy Behavior, Morals and Science: An Analysis of Mental Health Law, 51 S.
CAL. L. REv. 527, 600-26 (1978); Morse,Failed Explanations and Criminal Responsibility: Experts and
1he Unconscious, 68 VA. L. REv. 971-83, 1044-59 (1982) .
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vocate experts will not create an even more unseemly battle of the
experts than now obtains.
In those cases in which an advocate expert is not required by
due process or is not available for other reasons, the court should
be aware and should attempt to ensure that the jury recognizes that
the sole expert is not impartial. The court should require that the
sole expert be fully cross-examined. Judges should know and juries
should be instructed that unopposed expert testimony should be assessed cautiously and that it may be disregarded entirely. I also
suggest that a trial or appellate court should almost never overturn,
as a matter of law, a jury or judge's decisio n on the ground that
it is contrary to the weight of the expert evidence, even if the verdict
disregards unanimous expert testimony to the contrary. A factfinder's decision should not be overridden under such circumstances
because mental health law questions are primarily moral and social,
not scientific. There can be no ''weight of expert evidence'' on the
ultimate legal issue.
Vigorous, complete adversary procedures will not be a panacea
in mental health law adjudication, especially if the law does not
adopt necessary limitations on expert testimony, but they will promote greater honesty and integrity in decisionmaking and ensure that
crazy people are treated specially only when such treatment is truly
justified.

